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I~ THE SlPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Application for Admission 
to the Utah State Bar of 
DEBORAH LYNN TANNER, No. 15703 
Petitioner. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CA~E 
The Utah State Bar Board of Commissioners declined 
to recommend admission to the Utah State Bar of petitioner, 
because of her failure to successfully pass the Bar Examina-
tion. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
After review of petitioner's Bar Examination perfor-
mance, the Board of Commissioners sustained their prior deci-
sion that petitioner be denied admission to the Utah State 
Bar at this time. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner seeks an order from this Court granting 
her Petition for Admission to the Utah State Bar. 
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STATE~ENT OF FACTS 
The facts as stated in Petitioner's brief are 
essentially correct. One of the necessary criteria for pass-
age of the Bar Examination is that an applicant receive 
scores of 60 or above on at least 12 of the 18 essay 
questions. Petitioner, having passed only 9 on those ques-
tions, was deemed to have failed to pass the Examination. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE REQUIREMENT THAT BAR APPLICANTS 
PASS TWO/THIRDS OF THE BAR EXAMINATION'S 
ESSAY QUESTIONS IS REASONABLE. 
Petitioner argues that she should be admitted to the 
Bar because her weighted average for the entire examination 
was 60.75, above the minimum requirement of 60.00. While 
it is questionable that this score places petitioner "well 
above the 60.00 minimum passing score" (Brief at 3), it is 
used to advance the argument that it is unreasonable to 
also require passage of two/thirds of the essay questions 
in addition. Petitioner cites a recent decision of this 
Court for the proposition that the weighted average alone, 
should be criterion for examination passage. In re Guyon, 
(1977, unreported as far as the Bar can determine). 
We dispute that the Guyon case stands for that proposition. 
The opinion was specifically limited to the particular 
facts arising from the July 1976 Bar Examination, and even 
then, produced a majority opinion of only two Justices, 
with two dissenting opinions, and one which partly dissented, 
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but concurred in the main opinion. Even the quot3tion 
included in Petitioner's brief includes the caveat that the 
decision results "under all circumstances upon the grading 
procedures of this July 1976 examination The last 
paragraph of the Guyon opinion clearly limits it to those 
particular facts: 
In this opinion we have modified in this 
instance the formula adopted by the Bar 
Commissioners because, as herefore stated, 
we believe it would be unreasonable not to 
do so. That is all this opinion stands for 
and is intended to stand for. (emphasis added) 
The reasons for the requirement seem obvious - to 
demonstrate a broadly-based legal knowledge and expertise 
which will be utilized successfully and competently in 
future practice. Additionally, it serves to meet the purpose 
of Section 78-51-10 of UCA (1953), that requires each 
applicant to "have passed satisfactory examination upon the 
principles of common law, equity, criminal law and the 
statutes and practices of this state; 
Despite the difficulties in administering and grading 
essay questions, it is nevertheless, an appropriate means 
of assessment and meets the test propounded by the United 
States Supreme Court in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of 
New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1974), to wit: 
A State can require high standards of qual-
ification, such as good moral character or pro-
ficiency in its law before it admits an applicant 
to the bar, but any qualification must have a 
rational connection with the applicant's fitness 
or capacity to practice law. . Even in 
applying permissible standards, officers of a 
State cannot exclude an applicant when there is 
no basis for their finding that he fails to 
meet these standards, or when their action is 
invidiously discriminatory. 353 U.S. at 238-239. 
-3-
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The two/thirds rule provides soae assurance that 
the applicant has the necessary knowledge and skills in a 
range of legal subjects. The overall weighted average does 
not necessarily provide the same assurance, because suffi-
cient extremely high scores could offset the low ones. 
The requirement has a rational and reasonable relationship 
to the evaluation of the applicant's competency and should 
therefore, be retained. 
In the facts here, Petitioner needed to pass three 
more essay questions to meet the criteria. The disparity 
is sufficient to reasonably raise doubts as to competency. 





In this particular case, Miss Tanner 
passed 9 out of 18. 
That's correct. 
So, on half of the essay questions 
the Examiners felt that she didn't 
come up to the lowest level of com-
petency to practice in those fields. 
That's correct. 
(Transcript, p. 13, 
1. 4-11). 
The Petitioner's average score on all of the essay questions 
did not rise to the minimal 60.00 level. The overall 
weighted average exceeded 60.00 only because of the relative!: 
high score achieved on the Multistate portion of the 
Examination. It must be assumed, therefore, that the Peti-
tioner lacks those sorts of skills and knowledge tested in 
the essay portion of the exam and not reflected in the 
Multistate portion. The indications are that Petitioner 
is not presently qualified for admission to the Bar. 
-4-
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POI:\T II 
PETITIONER'S ANSWERS TO THE EXAMINATION 
WERE PROPERLY GRADED. 
Pelitioner attempts, in her brief, to second 
guess the Examiners in evaluating both the essay questions 
and the answers provided by Petitioner. This grants scant 
appreciation for the process engaged in by the Examiners 
in the preparation of the examination questions and subse-
quent grading of answers. The Bar urges that, except 
where there is a clear showing of arbitrariness, this 
Court adopt the findings of the Examiners and the Bar 
Commissioners. To do otherwise would simply duplicate 
the efforts already expended and make a mockery of the 
authority delegated by this Court to the Commission. 
Petitioner's criticisms of the questions, model 
answers and grading results are so generalized as to be 
meaningless. These criticisms included, among others, 
the following: an issue is not reasonable in light of 
the facts; one model answer is like a table of contents; 
one question is too broad; one is poorly worded; and 
one contains too many issues. In looking at Petitioner's 
answers, the brief states that one "seems adequate" and 
another is at least "passable." Also, Petitioner states 
that several questions must be defective because a relatively 
high percentage of applicants either failed or barely 
passed those particular questions. Then, the brief criti-
icizes another quPstion where only two applicants, including 
petitioner, failed. It seo~s that there is no way to 
win in such a contest. The ques tior1 "is improper, according 
-5-
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to Petitioner, if it is too difficult or if it is too 
easy. The grading process utilized by the Examiners is 
arduous and is described by Commissioners Sorenson, one 
of the Hearing Officers, in the transcript of proceedings, 
as follows: 
MR. SORENSON: In other words, there are teams 
of three readers. If the first 
reader determines that that paper 
does not meet the standard as 
compared against the model answer 
and how they read that, then it's 
reviewed by two other readers, 
as well. So, it takes three readers, 
in essence, to read that question 
to come up with that score. 
In these cases where there are 59, 
those three readers do not feel that 
the applicant has passed with suf fi-
cien t minimum qualifications in that 
area to receive a passing score. 
So, it isn't just a single person 
that makes that arbitrary ruling. 
It's three of them. 
So, while we are all human, as you 
indicated, nevertheless, there is the 
thinking of three minds that have been 
reading these things to arrive at a 
passing score, not just one. 
(Tr., p. 30, 1. 23-25, p. 30, 
1. 1-14). 
Petitioner seems to imply, at least by the number of 
criticisms, that essay exams are, per se, unfair or arbi-
trary. This argument has been raised in other jurisdictions. 
and found wanting. In Feldman v. State Board of Law Exam-
iners, 438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971), the court found that 
"Nor can it be said that an essay type examination is 
inherently unfair or that such a test has no rational 
connection with an applicant's f~.11ess or capacity to 
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practice law." at 705. A similar conclusion was arrived 
at in an earlier California case: 
The Court California Supreme Court has stated 
in effect that it will not engage in a regrading of 
examination papers - as no federal court is likely 
to do either. It said in Staly v. State Bar, 17 
Cal.2d 119, 121, 109 P.2d 667, that "Inability to 
pass the examinations, which are successfully passed 
by other applicants, will, of course, not be inquired 
into by the court." But it added that "if any 
dissatisfied applicant can show that he was denied 
passage of the state bar examinations through fraud, 
imposition or coercion this court will be 
willing to listen to his complaint." Chaney v. 
State Bar of California, 386 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 
196 7) 
A recent United States Supreme Court decision found that 
dismissal from medical school for academic insufficiencies 
required less in terms of due process hearing rights, than 
dismissal for academic reasons. "The difference calls for 
far less stringent procedural requirements in the case of 
academic dismissal." Board of Curators of U. of ~!issouri v. 
Horowitz, 435 U.S. (1978), 55 L.Ed2d 124, 133. In 
applying that standard herein, one would assume that 
the close perusal and careful methodology of the Bar Exam-
iners and the second review by the Board of Commissioners 
havesufficiently provided Petitioner with requisite due 
process. This Court ought to refuse to completely reassess 
the grading of the Bar Examiners, as urged by Petitioner, 
in the absence of supportable allegations of fraud, coercion 
or unwarranted discrimination. There are no such allegations 
herein. 
-7-
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POINT II I 
THE UTAH STATE BAR ADEQUATELY CO~PLIED 
WITH PETITIO~ER'S DISCOVERY REQCESTS AND 
PETIT ION ER S L'F FER ED c;o P REJC DICE THE RE FRO~!. 
Petitioner claims to have been hampered in these 
proceedings by the failure or refusal of the Bar to provide 
certain documentation. There are three areas W'here discovery 
was denied. Each will be discussed briefly, below. 
First, Petitioner requested information as to how 
and why the correlation between the multi-state and the 
essay portions was arrived at. This request was irrelevant 
because the weighting system whereby the weighted average 
is arrived at, resulted in an average in excess of 60.00 
the minimum passing level, for the Petitioner. Therefore, 
she was not harmed by that formula. Also, it was explained 
during the course of the hearing that the formula was man-
dated by this Court, having orginal jurisdiction and authori'.· 
over admission to practice law in the state of Utah. (Tr. p. 
1. 13-19). 
Second, Petitioner requested and was denied copies 
of passing answers for all applicants for the questions 
which she failed. This was denied by the Bar because of 
the burdensome nature of the request and because it was 
irrelevant. Petitioner was provided with copies of the 
questions, model answers and her answers. This was sufficie: 
to provide the needed information. Furthermore, because 
Petitioner has an unqualified right to take the Bar Exam-
ination again, she is not entitled to the requested docu-
ments. In Whitfield, v. Illinois Board of Law Examiners, 
-8-
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504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 197!;), the petitioner had the 
right to take the bar ex<1nination again. He had requested 
that he be able to see his examination answers and compare 
them with both model answers and successful answers. The 
court disagreed and found that "Given the availability of 
these alternative procedures, the requested procedures were 
not constitutionally required." at 478. The court further 
stated as follows: 
Furthermore, merely seeing his examination 
or comparing it with others would not allow plain-
tiff to expose errors or discern his abilities. 
These procedural rights would be virtually meaning-
less unless plaintiff also was able to confront the 
bar examiners and obtain from explanations of their 
grades. Several hundred applicants fail the Illinois 
Bar Examination annually. Requiring an explanation 
for each of these applicants would place an intolerable 
burden upon the bar examiners. It also would place 
at an unfair disadvantage those applicants who were 
taking the exam for the first time. 504 F.2d at 478. 
Therefore, failure to provide copies of passing answers 
was not unreasonable nor prejudicial under the circumstances. 
Lastly, Petitioner requested minutes of the Board 
of Commissioners and the Examiners Committee relating to 
the Bar Examination. Petitioner was informed that the 
Examiners kept no minutes and that the Commission minutes, 
while available, contained only conclusions, not reasoning. 
Again, the information requested was irrelevant. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has delegated to the Board of Commissioners 
the authority to test all bar applicants with a suitable 
examination and make recommendations to the Court as to 
admission to the Bar, based on the results of that exam-
ination and other factors. The Court ought to accord 
due deference to those recommendations, except where 
-9-
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the procedures and/or the results are grossly unreasonable, 
arbitrary or unfair. Such is not the case herein. The 
requirement that an applicant pass two/thirds of the essay 
questions of the Bar Examination is reasonable and rationally 
related to the ability to practice law. Furthermore, there 
has been no satisf acotry evidence presented that the grading 
of Petitioner's examination was unfair or erroneous. 
The Utah State Bar therefore urges that this Court 
adopt the Findings of the Commission and deny Petitioner's 
petition. 
DATED this l/r(/ day of June, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~?, / 62<<-c'Ct'Dc'd 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
Attorney for Respondent 
Utah State Bar 
425 E. First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent, Utah State Bar, were deposited in 
the mail, postage prepaid, to Virginius Dabney, Esq., 
McMillan & Browning, 1020 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101, this ?~day of June, 1978. 
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